Operation Cheshire
 

Finally, I turn to Operation CHESHIRE, which must be the riskiest operation undertaken by any aircraft in the RAF at the moment. I shall not go into the background of the operation. Suffice to say that the UN asked nations to provide aircraft to deliver aid to Sarajevo. The UK Government responded with an offer of one Hercules aircraft, and it has been flying into Sarajevo 3 times a day since July 92. Other nations who have donated aircraft permanently to the Operation are the US, Canada, France and Germany.

Initially the UK, Canada and Germany operated out of Zagreb in Croatia, with the French based in Split and the US at Rhein-Maine in Germany. Following an attempt to shoot down one of the airlift aircraft on climb-out from Zagreb, those based there moved to Ancona in Italy where a Joint Air Ops Centre (JAOC) was created. Essentially, the aircraft operate to the UNHCR requirement. Indeed, there is a UNHCR representative in JAOC. Similarly, each nation has a military representative in UN Headquarters in Geneva. Their job is to manage the airlift on behalf of the UNHCR. This entails coordinating flight activity, seeking agreements from the warring factions through UNPROFOR for safe passage for the airlift aircraft, determining criteria for the carriage of passengers out of Sarajevo, and generally acting as an intermediary between the civilian organisations who wish to use spare capacity on the aircraft. Should any airlift aircraft be threatened by indigenous ground forces Geneva would take protest action.

Back home, the political interface is maintained between the JHQ – represented by 38 Group staff – the MOD and the FCO, but it is in the daily contact between the JHQ, Geneva and Ancona where most activity occurs as the threat to the aircraft is continually evaluated. Also, following a series of incidents in 1993, a high level working group was set up to monitor the whole Operation, re-assess the risk when incidents occur and coordinate the decision-making process at an international level. The fact the SASO STC is the UK representative on the working group is testimony to our concerns about the Operation. Regrettably, our aircraft are regularly tracked by radar-layed AAA and occasionally pick up transmissions from potentially hostile systems. Clearly, they are at their most vunerable during approach and departure at Sarajevo; therefore the ground situation is continually monitored.

The detachment at Ancona is some 30 strong and includes a large Tactical Communications element to provide the essential secure communications, UKMAMS for palletising and loading the freight, RAF Police to provide protection on the airfield and security for the aircraft and crew while on the ground at Sarajevo, including passenger checks and Operations/Intelligence staff to link with the other nations in manning the JAOC. Finally, in addition to the aircrew, we must not forget the ground crew who service and repair the aircraft. Changing an engine or a propeller in the open is not an easy task but they set to with a will when it is required.

At the end of October 93 the RAF had delivered some 12,500 tons of aid to Sarajevo in some 880 visits, and flown close to 2,000 hours in the process. This represents some 18% of all aid delivered by air – not bad when we represent only 12% of the aircraft dedicated to the airlift.

It had been estimated that Sarajevo needs some 330 tons of food each day to survive. The airlift provides about 300 tons a day, sometimes more. The conclusion is obvious, if convoys do not get through the city will slowly starve. There is therefore a compelling moral obligation to deliver the aid. That said, we are not at war; but we are at substantial risk of being caught in the crossfire. We have been fortunate so far, in that there has been little damage to our aircraft – only 2 bullet holes. Others have been less so; the Italians lost a Fiat G222 aircraft to missile fire last year and it was only through the quick reaction of the crew that the Germans did not lose a C-160 in February 94. The hazards are evident. Therefore we continue to assess and re-assess the balance between risk and gain. In the deliberations within the High Level Working Group it has become abundantly clear that we have been close to the sensible limit of risk in the past. One hopes that we shall continue to get the balance right and not exceed it. We get it wrong at our peril.

Gp Capt DKL McDonnell, Royal Air Force 94, The Royal Air Force Public Relations Magazine 1994